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1 Introduction
100 years of relativity — but what is next? In this essay, I explore to what
extent general relativity (GR) itself suggests particular (candidate) successor
theories — or rather, to what extent the various empirical and conceptual in-
terpretational stances one can take concerning GR do. At a more general level,
the essay thus aims at demonstrating how interpretational questions allow for
systematically generating hypotheses about a successor theory to GR, and thus
conceiving of the theory change from GR as — at least potentially — a well-
guided process.
In section 2, I first clarify the notion of interpretation by using a three-fold
distinction by Curiel (2009). I will be concerned with the straightforward empir-
ical interpretation of a theory, that is what Curiel calls concrete interpretation
(sometimes also just empirical interpretation in the following), and the high-
level conceptual interpretation of a theory, that is what Curiel calls categorial
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interpretation. In section 3, I consider the rather unusual question in how far
empirical interpretation (concrete interpretation) can provide a guideline for a
successor theory to GR. I identify two potential strategies for suggesting a di-
rection in theory change from empirical interpretation: (1) On the one hand, we
can ask at a general level what other theory-external descriptions of the estab-
lished empirical content of the theory there are, and whether these should not
be incorporated as well. (2) On the other hand, we can wonder whether specific
options for increasing the empirical content of GR and the empirical access to
it via using external theories can encourage the unification of GR with exactly
these external theories. In section 4, I deal with the more common case of mo-
tivating successor theories to GR from its conceptual interpretations; I present
some examples of how different conceptual takes on GR encourage successor
theories to it.
2 Empirical interpretation(s) of a physical the-
ory
In dealing with the question of how to make sense of GR’s empirical content,
Curiel (2009) distinguishes three notions of empirical interpretation:
Concrete. The fixation of a semantics for the formalism, in the
sense that the formalism under the semantics expresses the empiri-
cal knowledge the framework contains—for example, the fixation of
a Tarskian family of models, or, less formally, the contents of a good,
comprehensive textbook.
Categorial. The explication of concepts in the theory that the se-
mantics of a concrete interpretation alone does not fix—for example,
a demonstration that the theory is deterministic in any of a variety
of senses.
Metalinguistic. The explication of the semantics of a concrete
interpretation, when the representational nature of the concrete in-
terpretation is itself not understood—for example, the Copenhagen
Interpretation of quantum mechanics. (p. 46)1
1Admittedly, it is not really clear why this interpretation is best dubbed ‘metalinguistic’,
since—as we will see—it can also be understood as a fine-grained correction or addition to
the concrete interpretation.
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Following Curiel, all physical theories require a concrete and a categorial in-
terpretation. More precisely: (1) All physical theories have to make contact with
the world in some way or the other in order to count as empirical theories. Thus,
there should be no dispute about that physical theories need to be interpreted
concretely. (2) Whether a categorial interpretation is necessary or not, does not
amount to a case-by-case question but rather to a general question of interest
independent of the nature of specific physical theories. Examples for categorial
questions include whether a theory is deterministic or indeterministic, whether
it allows for superluminal propagation or whether it is observer-independent or
-dependent. At least from the view of a philosopher of physics, all physical
theories should be worth being interpreted categorially in some way or another.
And in any case, a categorial question is either raised for all/a subset2 of the-
ories or not at all. More metaphysically-flavoured questions such as whether
a spacetime theory is substantivalist or relationist etc. are arguably categorial
as well. We will, however, ignore questions like this in the following as we are
interested in empirical senses of interpretation only.
In contrast, only a few physical theories, such as QM3 require a metalingustic
interpretation. That necessity of a metalinguistic interpretation is a case-by-case
question should be clear from that Newtonian mechanics, and QM respectively
provide paradigm examples for theories which do not have and have to be inter-
preted metalinguistically. As an illustration, consider that in both Newtonian
mechanics and QM the Hamiltonian’s value is assigned in one way or the other
to energy. Whereas in the former, this assignment holds without restriction, this
is not at all the case in QM:4 The Hamiltonian H is assigned to a measurable
2Certain categorial questions such as whether a theory allows for superluminal propagation
require a background framework to be even sensibly formulated in the first place. They thus
only make sense for a subset of theories admissible to this overarching framework. See for
instance Weatherall (2014) for a discussion of theory-overarching criteria for superluminal
propagation.
3Note that by ‘usual’, we mean textbook QM. This is not to say that the concrete inter-
pretation of QM cannot drastically vary either. GRW, for instance, is not just a metalinguistic
interpretation of QM but at the same time has a different concrete interpretation than stan-
dard QM. Within GRW, the characteristic spontaneous localisation process (including an
avalanche of localisations induced by a spontaneous localisation) is part of the empirically
measurable content.
4Cf. Curiel (2009), p. 47:
The way that Hermitian operators in standard quantum mechanics represent
observables is perhaps the canonical example of such a problem: we know they
do in some way or other represent observables, and we know how to use them to
construct good models of systems that we can use to predict the (probabilistic)
outcomes of experiments, but we have no clear understanding at all of the nature
of the representational relations between, on the one hand, the operator as part
of the formalism and, on the other, the actual values we measure for physical
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energy E in the concrete interpretation but then further qualification is needed:
The Hamiltonian H can only be assigned to a measurable energy E upon some
story of collapse of a generic state into an eigenstate of H, as H |ψ〉 = E |ψ〉 iff
|ψ〉 is an eigenstate of H.
(Strictly speaking, QM only has to be given some kind of qualificatory in-
terpretation for which a metalinguistic interpretation might be just one way
to do so: The Copenhagen interpretation fleshes out in how far operators are
‘observables’ and in particular in what sense experiments show determinate re-
sults by providing the primitive theory-external notion of collapse — this is an
instance of metalinguistic interpretation. As an alternative to this, the many-
worlds interpretation arguably provides a non-trivial internal qualification of
what happens in measurement through invoking the idea of a virtual, branch-
relative equivalent of an objective collapse. Both the Copenhagen as well as
the many-worlds ‘interpretations’ can be seen as qualificatory interpretations
on top of the usual concrete interpretation of QM. For a detailed explication
of the notion of qualificatory interpretation, which is beyond the scope of this
short overview on notions of empirical interpretations, see Linnemann (2019).)
2.1 The concrete interpretation in more detail
The notion of concrete interpretation can be straightforwardly cashed out in the
rather narrow positivist notion of partial interpretation (see Suppe (2000)):5
quantities in experiments.
5Note that a sensible partly interpretation (which the concrete interpretation amounts
to) does not have to follow mere empirical interests. For instance, Lehmkuhl (2017) exem-
plarily pleads for a partly (what he calls ‘careful’) rather than literal interpretation of the
Schwarzschild metric field even within a realist context when the metric is invoked in mod-
elling the perihelion motion of Mercury:
What Einstein really does is to convert the two-body problem Sun-Mercury into
a one-body problem, where one body (Mercury) is subject to an external gravita-
tional field. ... It is the exterior gravitational field of the Sun, not the Sun itself,
that is represented by the Schwarzschild metric. And that is enough to predict
the perihelion of Mercury: we do not need to know what the Sun is made of or
what happens in its interior; all that matters is the exterior gravitational field
that Mercury is subject to. Thus, worrying about the singularity at the center
of the Schwarzschild metric misses the point: we do not have to interpret the
interior part of the Schwarzschild metric literally, at least not in this application.
(pp. 1210-1211)
So, the Schwarzschild metric’s interior structure should not be seen as referring literally (not
even approximately) but rather as a placeholder for any kind of interior structure that (1)
would be compatible with the exterior metric field of the Schwarzschild solution, and (2)
would involve structure which can in the end be straightforwardly interpreted as referring to
the sun.
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For positivists, theories were partially interpreted axiomatic systems
TC where the axioms T were the theoretical laws expressed in a
theoretical vocabulary VT ; C were correspondence rules that con-
nected T with testable consequences formulated using a separate
observational vocabulary VO. Only VO sentences were given a direct
semantic interpretation. (p. S103)
On such a syntactic understanding of theories6, the concrete interpretation fixes
(and it alone fixes) by assignments the semantics necessary to test the theory
for empirical adequateness. It is commonly claimed that the syntactic view of
theories has by now been superseded by the semantic view of theories7 for a
set of well-known reasons: among other things, the syntactic view (unlike the
semantic view) is usually seen to (1) suffer from issues of theory individuation
(T1 = p→ q and T2 = ¬p ∨ q are logically equivalent but — oddly — different
syntactic theories), (2) make an untenable theoretical/observational distinction
at the level of language (rather than that of entities), and (3) narrowly require
theories to be formulated in first-order logic (see Winther (2016), and Suppe
(2000). Recent arguments, however, render the syntactic view as capable of
dealing with these challenges (see, for instance, Lutz (2014)), and as basically
equivalent to the semantic view (see Halvorson (2013) and Lutz (2017)).
Since we are only interested in denoting the empirical content of a theory, we
strictly speaking better stay uncommitted to the existence of the non-observable
part of the formalism (constructive empiricism). With the syntactic view, we,
however, run into the so-called closure problem8: given that belief statements
are normally closed under logical implication, fixing referents for the empirical
(and just for the empirical) on the syntactic view of theories will automatically
commit one to that certain theoretical terms refer as well. A statement which
mixes observable and theoretical terms such as “A table is a swarm of electrons,
protons and neutrons.” would, for instance, ground the existence of electrons,
protons and neutrons in the world based on that we believe that tables exist
in the world. This would run counter the idea that the concrete interpretation,
when defined syntactically as above, is just an empirical interpretation of the
6The syntactic view renders a theory as a set of statements T closed under logical impli-
cation (subset of statements, called axioms, generates T when requiring logical closure), and
correspondence rules between the entities in T and the world. See Winther (2016), section 2.
7The semantic view renders a theory as a set of models. In the context of a physical
theory, you can loosely think of each solution to the dynamical equations for a given set of
initial conditions as a model. See Winther (2016), in particular section 3.1.2, and references
within. A locus classicus is Van Fraassen (1980).
8First introduced by Friedman (1982). See also Rochefort-Maranda (2011).
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theory. Rather, partial interpretation as defined in the positivist sense above
goes along with a certain commitment as to which purely theoretical concepts
(such as electrons) refer. Now, as one normally does not want to give up the
logical closure of statements of belief, the problem should be evaded by either
switching from the syntactic view to the semantic view of theories, in particular
by making use of the ‘partial structure approach9 or by taking a fictionalist
stance on theoretical terms on which we can talk about protons, neutrons, elec-
trons etc. as if they existed in the world without committing that they actually
do (see Rochefort-Maranda (2011)). In the following, I will implicitly opt for
the latter option.
None of the above is to say that the idea of concrete interpretations should
or can only be cashed out by correspondence rules (on the syntactic view) or
partial structures (on the semantic view):
• Uninterpreted theoretical terms may be linked to already interpreted ones
(internal interpretations). Among others, (1) Stein (1994) proposes con-
necting a formal theory to the empirical by schematising the observer
within the theory, taking it to be straightforward how the observer should
then itself be linked to the world. (2) de Haro and de Regt (2018) provide
examples of how already interpreted elements can be used for an interpre-
tation of uninterpreted elements provided that they stand in a relevant
relationship (such as symmetry).
• Correspondence rules may employ an (approximate) correspondence of a
theoretical term to that of another theory for which the linkage to the
observable is readily established (external-theory interpretation). Typ-
ically, external theories to which the theory in question knowingly re-
duces are used for this purpose. The so-called Schwarzschild mass in
the Schwarzschild metric, for instance, can be to some degree interpreted
by identifying its role as mass within the Newtonian limit theory.
2.1.1 The dynamical nature of the concrete interpretation
So far it may have sounded as if the concrete interpretation was easily fixed once
and for all for a theory. However, the concrete interpretation of a theory — qua
9On the partial structure approach, the model is split up into a part which is known, and
a part which is not known to refer. This allows for denoting the observable-part to refer and
the un-observable to not refer. See Bueno (1997), section 3.
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activity — is, in fact, an ongoing affair. It is, for instance, in this sense that we
can read the following passage by Carnap (1966) on correspondence rules:
Of course, physicists always face the danger that they may develop
correspondence rules that will be incompatible with each other or
with the theoretical laws. As long as such incompatibility does not
occur, however, they are free to add new correspondence rules. The
procedure is never-ending. There is always the possibility of adding
new rules, thereby increasing the amount of interpretation specified
for the theoretical terms; but no matter how much this is increased,
the interpretation is never final. (p. 238)
Similarly, if you just loosely commit to cashing out the notion of concrete inter-
pretation in terms of the contents of a ‘good textbook’ — the meme Curiel uses
to display what he means by concrete interpretation — it should be clear that
there is no definitive, final textbook to be expected on a topic like GR anyway.
In the following, I will make use of what I call empirical access to and em-
pirical content of a theory which I define using the theoretical-observational
distinction, and the notion of correspondence rules: The empirical access to a
theory is given by the correspondence rules between theoretical and observa-
tional terms. It is increased when correspondence rules between a theoretical
vocabulary and the observational vocabulary are added. The empirical con-
tent of a theory is given by the observational terms which are actually linked
up to the theoretical terms by correspondence rules. It is increased when cor-
respondence rules between a theoretical vocabulary and specific observational
vocabulary which had neither directly nor indirectly (that is via other observa-
tional terms) been linked yet to theoretical terms become established. Increase
in empirical content always implies an increase in empirical access but not vice
versa.
The problem with the notion of empirical content is that it is highly de-
pendent on what we take the observational vocabulary to be, which itself is,
however, a problematic notion. As Carnap (1966) remarked,
To a philosopher, “observable” has a very narrow meaning. It applies
to such properties as “blue,” “hard,” “hot.” These are properties di-
rectly perceived by the senses. To the physicist, the word has a much
broader meaning. It includes any quantitative magnitude that can
be measured in a relatively simple, direct way. A philosopher would
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not consider a temperature of, perhaps, 80 degrees centigrade, or
a weight of 93 12 pounds, an observable because there is no direct
sensory perception of such magnitudes. To a physicist, both are ob-
servables because they can be measured in an extremely simple way.
The object to be weighed is placed on a balance scale. The tem-
perature is measured with a thermometer. The physicist would not
say that the mass of a molecule, let alone the mass of an electron, is
something observable, because here the procedures of measurement
are much more complicated and indirect. (pp. 225-226)
So, we will mainly focus on the notion of empirical access in the following.
But even here one might be sceptical: When adding correspondence rules linking
theoretical terms from T to observational terms from O via making recourse to
external vocabulary from T ′ it is important to make sure that we are not just
artificially inserting notions from T ′ in-between notions from T and O. What
we have to require, thus, is that these additional paths from notions of T to
notions of O via notions of T ′ feature notions of T ′ in a non-redundant fashion
of one form or the other.
2.1.2 GR’s concrete interpretation
A minimal concrete interpretation of GR includes the (potential) association of
null geodesics with light rays, timelike curves with point particles of positive
mass, and timelike geodesics with free point particles of positive mass (see, for
instance, the interpretive principles (C1), (C2), and (P1) in Malament (2012),
p. 120-121).
The, arguably, most minimal scheme for empirical access to the metric field
in GR, then, builds on what is called the causal-inertial method: Based on a
theorem by Weyl (1921)10, Ehlers et al. (2012) provide a prescriptive scheme for
determining the metric from the movement of light rays (linked to what’s known
as conformal structure) and freely falling particles (linked to what’s known as
projective structure) alone: an observer hereby tracks light rays and freely falling
particles relative to local radar coordinates which use an arbitrary parameter-
isation of the observer’s worldline as time parameterisation. It is important
to stress that the scheme assumes that sufficiently well-defined radar coordi-
10The theorem basically states that “the projective and conformal state of a metric space
determine the metric uniquely” (see Coleman and Korte (1980), Theorem 4.3).
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nates can be set up in the first place.11 Once the observer is thus schematised
in the theory (see Stein (1994)), the metric structure can be interpreted in-
ternally through the procedure on how the observer measures out the metric
structure using just the few elements of the theory already linked to the world
(null geodesics, and time-like paths).
The causal-inertial method for accessing the metric field provides an internal
interpretation of the metric field based on the minimal concrete interpretation of
null geodesics and timelike curves. Similarly, one could adhere to a theorem by
Fletcher (2013) for arguing that null geodesics (corresponding to light) as well
as timelike curves (corresponding to massive particles) can be used to construct
clocks within the general relativistic model that read out the worldline interval.
Alternatively, one might, however, also interpret the metric structure through
correspondence rules directly. The worldline interval, for instance, is linked by
brute force to the reading of an ideal clock on the chronometric approach of
Synge (1960).
It is also worth noting that, in regimes of weak gravitation, empirical content
of GR can in a limited sense be fixed through Newtonian and post-Newtonian
approximation of GR (external interpretation); as already mentioned before,
the so-called Schwarzschild mass, for instance, acts effectively as a Newtonian
point mass on observers who are far enough away from the inner region of the
Schwarzschild spacetime.
3 Guidelines from GR’s empirical interpretation
We can use the concrete interpretation of GR in at least two ways to get a
glimpse at what kind of theory succeeds GR: (1) We can take the usually at-
tributed empirical content seriously at a general level, that is wonder what other
external theory-descriptions of the established empirical content there is, and
whether these external theory-descriptions should not be merged with GR’s for-
malism. This straightforwardly suggests a change of the formalism, and thus
provides a direct guideline for theory development. (2) We can take the em-
pirical content of the theory seriously at a more specific level: (a) We can
consider whether — also under adherence to external theories — elements of
GR’s formalism should, after all, be empirically interpreted, that is linked to the
11The scheme was subsequently heavily improved; Coleman and Korte (1980), in particular,
managed to free the scheme from charges of circularity. See Bell and Korte´ (2016) for a
summary.
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empirical by some correspondence rule. Call the posit behind this the principle
of maximal concrete interpretation (PMCI): A theory’s potential concrete in-
terpretation should be exploited to a maximum degree, that is one should strive
for the maximal (in principle) empirical content associable to a given theoretical
formalism even if this may involve taking into account extratheoretical elements
into its semantics. (b) We can consider whether — under adherence to external
theories — the empirical content of GR becomes accessible in new ways. Call
the posit behind this the principle of maximal empirical access (PMEA): One
should strive for as many (in principle) modes of access possible to the empirical
content even if this may involve taking into account extra-theoretical elements
into its semantics. Positive results for (a) and (b) both suggest merging the
external theories’ formalism adhered to with GR’s formalism. More precisely,
when extending the standard theory’s empirical interpretation through invok-
ing an external theory, both the theory to be interpreted more and the theory
invoked for this become to a certain extent entangled at the level of empiri-
cal interpretation: their empirical interpretations are not independent of each
other anymore but at least one interpretation now also does recourse to the
other. Such a strong entanglement at the semantic level then also suggests
some sort of merging of the theories at the formal level. I now illustrate these
rather abstract strategies (1) and (2). Thereby, I make two natural heuristics
for motivating theory change into a particular direction explicit which are both
based on quasi-empirical consideration.
3.1 General approach
GR-matter fields12 φ1, . . . , φn such as the electromagnetic field-strength tensor
Fab are linked to elements in the observable regime which — provided that cur-
vature effects are negligible — are known to be locally more precisely described
as quantum fields in flat spacetime than classical fields in curved spacetime.
Thus,
• GR should be enhanced to take into account that the fields φ1, . . . , φn
are locally better described as quantum fields in flat spacetime than as
classical fields (provided that local curvature effects are negligible). This
12In the standard formalism GR is formulated as a theory of fields on a 4-dimensional
manifold with a symmetric rank-two tensor, the metric g of Lorentzian signature, and other
(tensor) fields φ1, . . . φm (such as the electromagnetic field-strength tensor Fab) ‘on top’. The
fields φi1 , . . . φin which contribute to the energy-momentum tensor T are then called matter
fields.
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leads to QFT in curved spacetime, which treats quantum field theories
in curved but static Lorentzian background geometries; and, as QFT in
curved spacetime neglects back-reaction of the field to its now quantum
matter content, to semi-classical gravity, which builds around the semi-
classical field equations Gab = 8pi〈Tˆab〉 where 〈Tˆab〉 is the expectation value
of an operator-valued energy-momentum tensor (see Wald (1994)).
• The field equation links the field g (via the Einstein tensor Gab) to the
matter fields φ1, . . . , φn (via the energy-momentum tensor Tab), i.e. Gab =
8piTab. The referents of the right-hand side of this equation are — as
just stressed — known to be locally modelled as quantum theories in
flat spacetime (provided that local curvature effects are negligible). This
suggests then that G on the left-hand side, or rather g making up G, has
referents that should be formulated as a quantum theory as well, and thus
the quantisation of GR as such — at least if the semi-classical account
turns out to insufficient.
3.2 Specific approaches
I present two examples — one from chronometry, the other from black hole
thermodynamics — of how the concrete interpretation of GR can be extended
under adherence to the (PMEC) or the (PMEA). Only the second of the two
examples, however, provides a relevant insight as to where a successor theory
to GR should be heading, which shows us that not every increase in empirical
content or empirical access provides non-trivial hints.
3.2.1 Chronometric interpretation
Empirical access to the world-line interval in GR can be largely extended through
the purely interpretative (albeit not necessarily empirically adequate) stipula-
tion that external clocks — not modellable within the GR-framework itself —
read out the worldline interval of the path they are travelling along (i.e., fulfil
what has become known as the clock hypothesis13).14
13See Maudlin (2012), chapter 5, and Fletcher (2013).
14It is important to note, however, that external clocks are not required in many space-
times for gaining chronometric access to the metric field: As a theorem by Fletcher (2013)
demonstrates, light clocks internal to GR can be set up to measure the world-line interval
of the metric up to arbitrary precision — provided that light can be said to move on null
geodesics (see section 2.2.1).
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How well this stipulation works, can be checked (for instance) using an op-
erationalist criterion by Perlick (2008). So, whether a clock is a standard clock
or not, is tested by tracking the movement of freely falling particles and light
in (local) radar coordinates that are induced by the clock under consideration.
More precisely, the clock in question is used to provide a parametrisation for the
observer’s world-line. Using this parametrisation and light signals, the observer
can set up radar coordinates: Objects away from the word line are assigned a
radial distance of R = 1/2(t2 − t1) and a time T = 1/2(t2 + t1) where t1 is
the parameter value on the world-line which corresponds to emission, and t2
is the parameter value on the world line which corresponds to detection of the
probing light signal. A clock reads out proper time at clock time t0 (that is, is
a standard/ideal clock) if and only if
d2R
dT 2
1− (dRdT )2
∣∣∣
t=t0
= ±
d2R′
dT ′2
1− (dR′dT ′ )2
∣∣∣
t=t0
(∗)
where (R, T ) and (R′, T ′) denote the radar coordinates for two free particles
respectively, sent off at t = t0 into the same direction with differing speed (‘+’)
or into opposite directions with arbitrary speeds (apart from that at least one
needs to have a non-zero speed) (‘-’). In other words, the extent to which a
clock approximates a standard clock ‘at a point’ can be measured through the
difference ∆ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ d2RdT21−( dRdT )2 ∣∣∣t=t0
∥∥∥∥− ∥∥∥∥ d2R′dT ′21−( dR′
dT ′ )
2
∣∣∣
t=t0
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥ with ‖..‖ being a suitably
chosen norm. For a freely falling standard clock, even
d2R
dT2
1−( dRdT )2
∣∣∣
t=t0
= 0, i.e.
d2R
dT 2
∣∣∣
t=t0
= 0. That is, the radar coordinates induced by a freely falling standard
clock make the connection coefficients for the radial acceleration equation vanish
at t = t0.
Why should, however, a device fulfil (∗)? That some external element (like
an atomic clock) not at all describable in a general relativistic framework can be
found to fulfil this condition, might be argued for from some selection process:
we have simply managed to identify an ‘apparatus’ (such as an atom’s oscillatory
states) which suits our needs. The question of what ultimately makes this
selection process possible in the first place remains. Now, the best explanation
for why the atomic clock can be used to measure out the world-line interval is
then simply that there is some sense in which quantum field theory (describing
the atomic clock) and GR (describing the world-line interval) go along with
each other. The hereby suggested unification is a bit sobering, however: we
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already know much more straightforwardly — namely from that the matter
content adhered to in GR usually have a quantum description in approximately
locally flat spacetime regions — that some kind of theory like QFT in curved
spacetime/semi-classical gravity is needed (see section 3.1).
(As an alternative to the straightforward chronometric interpretation, one
could — in tradition of the dynamical approach to relativity15 stipulate the
strong equivalence principle (SEP) — loosely speaking the idea that the mat-
ter field dynamics in GR is somewhat locally Minkowskian — as a means of
establishing operational access to the metric via theory-external clocks:
... [the strong equivalence principle] allows us to carry over certain
interpretational possibilities from SR. In particular, it allows us to
transfer the interpretation of rods and clocks as waywisers of the
metric tensor from the special case of the Minkowski metric to the
case of a generically curved (but locally Minkowskian) metric, and it
allows us to interpret the frames of reference in which the metric is
locally Minkowskian as local inertial frames in the sense of ‘inertial
frame’ we are wont to use from SR. The local validity of SR allows
a ‘trickling up’ of interpretations from SR to GR. I said that this
makes the role of the SEP seem interpretational, but we have to
be careful not to see its role as ‘merely’ interpretational. The SEP
explains why rods and clocks can serve as waywisers of the metric
field. (Lehmkuhl (2011), p. 26)
The problem with this is that currently known versions of the SEP are not
satisfactorily formulated to this purpose (see appendix).)
3.2.2 Thermodynamic interpretation
When seen within the narrow context of GR, the so-called black hole ther-
modynamic laws are statements on the relationship between geometry, and the
energy and charges at asymptotic infinity of the spacetimes to which they apply;
they are analogous to the standard thermodynamic laws (see table 1). How-
ever, once understood in the context of semi-classical GR (which clearly goes
beyond GR proper)—in particular in light of Hawking’s derivation of what is
now called Hawking radiation—they are typically interpreted as proper laws of
15See Brown (2005), and, relatedly, Knox (2013).
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Standard thermody-
namics
Black hole thermo-
dynamics
Zeroth law: T constant on a body in κ constant on the hori-
zon
thermal equilibrium of a stationary black
hole
First law: dE = TdS−pdV +µdN dM = κ8piGdA+ΩHdJ+
ΦHdQ
Second law: dS ≥ 0 dA ≥ 0
Third law: T = 0 cannot be
reached
κ = 0 cannot be
reached
Table 1: Overview of the analogies between standard thermodynamic laws and
stationary black hole thermodynamics (largely taken from Kiefer (2004), p.
202). On the thermodynamic side, T is the temperature, S the entropy, p the
pressure, V the volume, µ the chemical potential, and N the particle number
of the standard thermodynamic system. On the black hole side of the analogy,
κ is the surface gravity, A is the horizon area, ΩH the angular velocity, J is the
angular momentum, Φ is the electrostatic potential, and Q the electric charge
of a black hole.
thermodynamics.16
But what keeps us from interpreting the surface gravity17 starring in the
black hole thermodynamic laws as thermodynamic temperature already at the
level of GR proper? This association is (in principle) falsifiable, and well-
motivated from the analogy (never mind that classical black holes do not allow
for escape from its internal region, and are thus associated, if at all, with a
temperature T = 0).18 I consider now in what senses GR’s black hole thermo-
dynamic laws call for a tentative extension of GR’s concrete interpretation.
More precisely: GR has a theoretical vocabulary TGR, and thermodynam-
ics that of TThermodynamics. The theory-overarching observational vocabulary is
16At least in the physics community. For critical accounts on the status of black hole
thermodynamics qua thermodynamics, see Wu¨thrich (2019) and Dougherty and Callender
(Forthcoming); for a defence of the orthodox view on black hole thermodynamics as more
than an analogy, see Wallace (2017).
17Or a multiple thereof. After all, the first law only allows for an association of T with κ
and S with A up to a positive constant k, i.e. T = kκ and S = A
k
.
18In semi-classical gravity this association is derived as what is known as Hawking radiation.
For the original paper, see Hawking (1975). It was this finding which made physicists finally
believe that black hole thermodynamics is more than an analogy. The point here is that this
association would be worth trying even if we had no hints from a theory beyond GR for its
potential validity yet. For a consequent albeit heavily heterodox plea for why even classical
black holes should be assigned temperature (and in general, thermodynamic features), see
Curiel (2014).
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O. Correspondence rules C(TGR, O) connect elements from TGR to elements
in O. Notably, no correspondence rules on the standard conception links any
theoretical term from GR to the “sensation of temperature“, oheat sensation ∈ O.
Now, stipulate that the surface gravity κ ∈ TGR corresponds to the tempera-
ture ∈ TThermodynamics, that is that there is an inter-theoretical relation “κ =
c · T” ∈ C ′(TGR, TThermodynamics) where C ′(TGR, TThermodynamics) denote corre-
spondence rules between the theoretical vocabulary of GR and that of thermody-
namics, and c is a constant. Under this assumption, κ ∈ TGR could be associated
to (1) the point coincidences observed on a thermometer opoint coincidence ∈ O,
and arguably even to (2) the sensation of heat oheat sensation ∈ O.
If case (1) is empirically established, the empirical access linked to GR’s
empirical content is increased, as now additional correspondence rules between
κ and the observation of point coincidences exist (which run, in a non-redundant
fashion, via the usage of a thermometer).
If case (2) was empirically established, even the empirical content linked to
GR’s formalism would be increased as correspondence rules between the sur-
face gravity in GR and the sensation of heat are established for the first time.
Note though that there seems to be an in principle limit to our human sensa-
tion of temperature — to still under-exaggerate — far off from the sensational
sensitivity needed.
The problem, however, is that we expect from the QFT derivation of Hawk-
ing radiation that T = κ8pi is too small for detection
19, not to say directly
perceivable by a human observer.20
What is the thermodynamic interpretation good for then? That the thermo-
dynamic interpretation could in principle increase empirical access to GR is a
necessary requirement for that black hole thermodynamics can be rendered an
instance of thermodynamics proper. Therefore, that we can at all conceive of
the analogy as potentially increasing empirical access to GR, is a first good sign
for that the analogy between black hole thermodynamics and thermodynamics
proper is more than an analogy; in other words, our intuitive trust, if any, in
black hole thermodynamics qua thermodynamics derives from the conceivabil-
ity that thermometers, photon gases, ... can be brought into contact with a
19For astronomical black holes, the corresponding Hawking radiation is many orders smaller
than the temperature of the cosmic microwave backgrounds. Small enough black holes for
detection, on the other hand, would evaporate away too fast to be measurable.
20From the analogy at the level of GR, the putative black hole temperature can only
be determined as equal to the surface gravity up to a constant pre-factor, which leaves the
magnitude of the temperature undetermined.
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black hole.21 But this means that it is also considerations of increased empiri-
cal accessibility of GR via thermodynamics which foster the idea that black hole
thermodynamics is thermodynamics proper.
4 Guidelines from GR’s conceptual interpreta-
tion
Practice in quantum gravity research — the search for a successor theory to GR
— goes far beyond motivating successors to GR from exploring GR’s empirical
content. Different quantum gravity approaches are rather suggested from stress-
ing specific conceptual takes on GR, that is: Issues of categorial interpretation
— Is the theory a geometrised spacetime theory? Is the theory a hydrodynamic
theory? Is the theory a causal theory? — provide different perspectives on the
theory; these conceptual categorisations of GR then suggest natural starting
points for extrapolating GR, say from how these conceptual categorisations are
already known to be linked to certain specific extrapolative strategies in other
contexts.22 For better illustration, let me provide some examples for links be-
tween conceptual interpretational stances on GR and extrapolative hypotheses:
• The categorisation of GR as a geometric spacetime theory directly derives
from its standard differential geometric presentation (see, for instance, the
canonical textbooks by Wald (2010) or Misner et al. (2017)). It has been
explicitly voiced as such, among others, by Friedman (2014) and Maudlin
(2012).23 In giving the gravitational interaction a special character as in-
trinsically geometric, the geometric viewpoint naturally motivates a semi-
21See also Prunkl and Timpson (2017).
22The two examples invoked for demonstrating how enlarging the concrete interpretation
drives theory change can also be thought of as special cases of categorial interpretations,
namely categorial interpretations which have (in-principle) empirical testability: In the case
of demanding that the surface gravity can also be measured via thermometers, GR is concep-
tualised as a (partly) thermodynamic theory, and, in the case of enriching the chronometric
access to GR, GR is conceptualised as a (locally) special relativistic theory in a sufficiently
strong sense (not just the dynamical equations are locally Lorentz-invariant but they are
form-invariant).
23The alternative position is that of the field view, which loosely speaking, renders the
metric field as just one field, among others. Of course, the metric field has special properties
but so does every other field; the basic methodological posit behind the field view is then not
to mistake (arguably contingent) matters of representation for decisive facts. The particle
physics approach to GR (“spin-2”) as, for instance, promoted by Weinberg and Dicke (1973)
(see Salimkhani (2017) for a philosophical introduction), and hydrodynamic viewpoints on
GR (see below) promote exactly such kind of take. Within the philosophy of physics, the
field view is first and foremost promoted by adherents to the dynamical approach (see Brown
(2005) as the locus classicus).
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classical viewpoint according to which the geometric nature of spacetime is
conserved and becomes the arena for quantum fields (semi-classical grav-
ity).24
• GR can be seen as a locally thermodynamic theory: among other things25,
the field equations can be interpreted as a balance equation of a heat flux
through the horizon of a (local) Rindler observer (see Jacobson (1995)).26
Taking the thermodynamic viewpoint seriously — including the stipu-
lation of a generalised second law of thermodynamics27 — entails the
holographic principle, which itself suggests a hypothesis on the number of
microstates within a volume as being bounded by their surrounding area
(see, for instance, Bousso (2002), section III).
• Connected to the previous viewpoint, GR can be seen as a hydrodynamic
theory: under restriction to spacetimes with at least one Killing symme-
try, the field equations take the form of the Navier-Stokes equations.28
Rendering the field equations as hydrodynamic equations suggests consid-
ering fluctuation corrections to the field equations. This is exactly what
is done in Hu’s stochastic gravity (see Hu (1999)).
• Following a theorem by Malament (1977), spacetime structure in GR can
be split up into (continuous) causal structure and local volume informa-
tion. By making the causal viewpoint central, the volume information
can be demoted to a secondary feature. (Provided that we assume a finite
number of causal events, the volume information can then be obtained
through counting the number of causal events in a region.) This naturally
leads to causal set theory.
• GR is universal coupling. This can be seen either as a necessary feature
of its putative geometric nature (see first point), or as a sign for that
it is the result of coarse-graining (its geometric nature is then rather a
representational coincidence).29 The latter view suggests taking analogies
24For a discussion of arguments against semi-classical accounts as fundamental theories,
see Callender and Huggett (2001) and Wu¨thrich (2005). For a modern thought experiment
for testing the scope of a semi-classical gravity paradigm, see Bose et al. (2017).
25See Padmanabhan (2016), section 1 for a comparison of various account of gravity as a
thermodynamic theory.
26Strictly speaking, this requires, however, adherence to the Unruh effect, that is an effect
from QFT in flat spacetime.
27The second law holds for matter and black hole entropy in total.
28See, for instance, Rodrigues Jr. and de Oliveira (2016), chapter 15.
29See Feynman et al. (2003), section 1.5.
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between GR and non-geometrical theories more seriously again.
We can note that, in practice, many principles and associated viewpoints just
seem to make themselves remarkable, say by analogy to other theories. However,
one way to systematically work out decisive principles and thus viewpoints of
GR is a contrastive approach where GR is compared to neighbouring spacetime
theories in order to reveal features making GR special, and thus worth specific
attention — see Lehmkuhl et al. (2017) for a project along these lines.
Furthermore, we can note that each conceptual take on GR above can usu-
ally be backed up from several strands of reasoning. It is an urgent question
then for the philosophy of quantum gravity qua philosophy of discovery to what
extent robustness arguments which work at an entirely conceptual and thus
non-empirical level can support the pursuit-worthiness or even plausibility of a
specific conceptual viewpoint on GR.
Concerning the motivation of hypotheses from a specific viewpoint, we can make
the following two observations: (1) Each of these viewpoints on GR suggests
characteristic extrapolative hypotheses. In many cases, these hypotheses are
suggested by analogy: a particular viewpoint is known to be linked to specific
extrapolative strategies in the context of other theories, which can be exploited
in the context of GR then. In some other cases, taking a viewpoint seriously
more or less requires making new technical commitments or discarding old ones.
Causal set theory is a good example for this as it arises from taking the causal
viewpoint seriously which means discretising the space of events, and thus giving
up a notion of Lorentz-symmetry and Lorentzian manifold at high energies.30
(2) By suggesting characteristic extrapolative hypotheses, categorial interpreta-
tions obtain a decisive role in motivating prima facie independent approaches.
What we call the principles of a specific approach to quantum gravity, is thus
often already rooted in a specific way of looking at GR, i.e. a specific categorial
interpretational stance.
5 Conclusion
This essay showed how both empirical and conceptual interpretations of GR
give straightforward suggestions for a successor theory to GR. I identified the
following heuristic rules for driving theory change from interpreting GR:
30Which does not mean that CST is inconsistent with Lorentz symmetry at lower energies.
See Dowker et al. (2004).
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• At the level of the empirical interpretation:
(1) Take the empirical content seriously at a general level: Look for
entities adhered to in the theory but knowingly described more accu-
rately in certain domains by other theories. This suggests potential
directions for unification.
(2) Take the empirical content seriously at a specific level: Look for
extratheoretical measurement methods of otherwise empirically un-
interpreted parts of the theory. This suggests potential directions for
unification of GR.
• At the level of the conceptual interpretation:
(1) Explore possible conceptual readings of the theory. Directions for
conceptual readings are at first suggested by striking conceptual
analogies to other theories, and prominent conceptual features or
results as such.
(2) Try extrapolative schemes generally associated to a certain concep-
tual categorisation of the theory.
(3) If a conceptual viewpoint is novel, that is not known from other
theories (as the viewpoint of GR as a causal theory), explore options
for making this viewpoint centre-stage nevertheless. This may easily
involve violating principles of the current theory (such as that of a
Lorentzian manifold in the case of causal set theory). In fact, possible
conflicts again drive progress here, as they provide a concrete problem
to tackle.
Now, the heuristic of using empirical and concrete interpretation as a guide
towards successor theories can, of course, again be used on the thereby suggested
successor theories such as QFT in curved spacetime, semi-classical gravity, and
quantum GR. The full merit of the promoted methodology thus derives from
its iterative applicability.
A final remark is in order on the relationship between theory interpretation
and internal problems as theory drivers: The essay investigated how theory
interpretation suggest directions for theory change. At the same time, it is a
common theme — in particular in quantum gravity research where the problem
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is first of all theoretical and not empirical31 — that internal problems suggest
the alteration of a theory into a certain direction. Now, it is worth stressing
that of course not the problem as such but rather the conceptual interpretation
of the theory featuring the problem suggests the direction for theory change.
The problem as such can at most only indicate the need for theory change.
References
John L. Bell and Herbert Korte´. Hermann Weyl. In Edward N. Zalta, ed-
itor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, winter 2016 edition, 2016.
Sougato Bose, Anupam Mazumdar, Gavin W. Morley, Hendrik Ulbricht, Marko
Torosˇ, Mauro Paternostro, Andrew A. Geraci, Peter F. Barker, M.S. Kim,
and Gerard Milburn. Spin entanglement witness for quantum gravity. Phys.
Rev. Lett., 119(24):240401, 2017.
Raphael Bousso. The holographic principle. Reviews of Modern Physics, 74(3):
825, 2002.
Harvey R. Brown. Physical relativity: Space-time structure from a dynamical
perspective. Oxford University Press, 2005.
Ota´vio Bueno. Empirical adequacy: A partial structures approach. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 28(4):585–610, 1997.
Craig Callender and Nick Huggett. Physics meets philosophy at the Planck scale:
Contemporary theories in quantum gravity. Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Rudolf Carnap. Philosophical foundations of physics, volume 966. Basic Books
New York, 1966.
Robert Alan Coleman and Herbert Korte. Jet bundles and path structures.
Journal of Mathematical Physics, 21(6):1340–1351, 1980.
Erik Curiel. General relativity needs no interpretation. Philosophy of Science,
76(1):44–72, 2009.
31Examples include: (1) GR spacetimes are partly singular. These spacetimes are not
sufficiently predictive. (2) QFT in curved spacetime lacks back-reaction (which we know
is desirable from GR). (3) Semi-classical gravity is possibly incoherent and thus at least
predictively limited. (4) Perturbative quantisation of gravity leads to an only effectively
renormalisable, that is predictively limited theory.
20
Erik Curiel. Classical black holes are hot. arXiv preprint arXiv:1408.3691, 2014.
Sebastian de Haro and Henk W. de Regt. Interpreting theories without a space-
time. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, pages 1–40, 2018.
John Dougherty and Craig Callender. Black hole thermodynamics: More than
an analogy? In Barry Loewer, editor, Philosophy of Cosmology. Cam-
bridge University Press, Forthcoming. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/
13195/.
Fay Dowker, Joe Henson, and Rafael D. Sorkin. Quantum gravity phenomenol-
ogy, lorentz invariance and discreteness. Modern Physics Letters A, 19(24):
1829–1840, 2004.
Ju¨rgen Ehlers, Felix A. E. Pirani, and Alfred Schild. Republication of: The ge-
ometry of free fall and light propagation. General Relativity and Gravitation,
44(6):1587–1609, 2012.
Richard P. Feynman, Fernando B. Morinigo, and William G. Wagner. Feynman
lectures on gravitation, 2003.
Samuel C. Fletcher. Light clocks and the clock hypothesis. Foundations of
Physics, 43(11):1369–1383, Nov 2013. ISSN 1572-9516. URL https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10701-013-9751-3.
Michael Friedman. The scientific image by Bas C. van Fraassen. The Journal
of Philosophy, 79(5):274–283, 1982.
Michael Friedman. Foundations of space-time theories: Relativistic physics and
philosophy of science, volume 113. Princeton University Press, 2014.
Hans Halvorson. The semantic view, if plausible, is syntactic. Philosophy of
Science, 80(3):475–478, 2013.
Stephen W. Hawking. Particle creation by black holes. Communications in
mathematical physics, 43(3):199–220, 1975.
B. L. Hu. Stochastic gravity. International Journal of Theoretical Physics, 38
(11):2987–3037, 1999.
Ted Jacobson. Thermodynamics of spacetime: the Einstein equation of state.
Phys. Rev. Lett., 75(7):1260, 1995.
21
Claus Kiefer. Quantum gravity. Int. Ser. Monogr. Phys., 124:1–308, 2004.
Eleanor Knox. Effective spacetime geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 44
(3):346–356, 2013.
Dennis Lehmkuhl. Mass–energy–momentum: Only there because of spacetime?
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62(3):453–488, 2011.
Dennis Lehmkuhl. Literal versus careful interpretations of scientific theories:
The vacuum approach to the problem of motion in general relativity. Philos-
ophy of Science, 84(5):1202–1214, 2017.
Dennis Lehmkuhl, Gregor Schiemann, and Erhard Scholz. Towards a theory of
spacetime theories, volume 13. Springer, 2017.
Niels Linnemann. On interpreting the empirical content of general relativity.
Unpublished draft, 2019.
Sebastian Lutz. What’s right with a syntactic approach to theories and models?
Erkenntnis, 79(8):1475–1492, 2014.
Sebastian Lutz. What was the syntax-semantics debate in the philosophy of
science about? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(2):319–352,
2017.
David B. Malament. The class of continuous timelike curves determines the
topology of spacetime. Journal of mathematical physics, 18(7):1399–1404,
1977.
David B. Malament. Topics in the foundations of general relativity and Newto-
nian gravitation theory. The University of Chicago Press, 2012.
Tim Maudlin. Philosophy of physics: Space and time, volume 5. Princeton
University Press, 2012.
Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne, and John Archibald Wheeler. Gravitation.
Princeton University Press, 2017.
Thanu Padmanabhan. Exploring the nature of gravity. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1602.01474, 2016.
22
Volker Perlick. On the radar method in general-relativistic spacetimes. In
Lasers, Clocks and Drag-Free Control, pages 131–152. Springer, 2008.
Carina Prunkl and Christopher Timpson. Black Hole Entropy is Entropy and
not (necessarily) Information. Unpublished draft, 2017.
Guillaume Rochefort-Maranda. Constructive empiricism and the closure prob-
lem. Erkenntnis, 75(1):61–65, 2011.
Waldyr A. Rodrigues Jr. and Edmundo Capelas de Oliveira. The Many Faces of
Maxwell, Dirac and Einstein Equations: A Clifford Bundle Approach, volume
922. Springer, 2016.
Kian Salimkhani. Quantum Gravity: A Dogma of Unification? Philosophy of
Science – Between Natural Science, the Social Sciences, and the Humanities,
European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Springer, 2017.
Howard Stein. Some reflections on the structure of our knowledge in physics. In
Logic, Metholodogy and Philosophy of Science, Proceedings of the Ninth In-
ternational Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, pages
633–55. Citeseer, 1994.
Frederick Suppe. Understanding scientific theories: An assessment of develop-
ments, 1969-1998. Philosophy of Science, 67:S102–S115, 2000.
John Lighton Synge. Relativity: the general theory. North-Holland Publishing
Company Amsterdam, 1960.
Bas C. Van Fraassen. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, 1980.
Robert M. Wald. Quantum field theory in curved spacetime and black hole
thermodynamics. The University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Robert M. Wald. General relativity. The University of Chicago Press, 2010.
David Wallace. The case for black hole thermodynamics, Part i: phenomeno-
logical thermodynamics. arXiv preprint arXiv:710.02724, 2017.
James Owen Weatherall. Against dogma: On superluminal propagation
in classical electromagnetism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Sci-
ence Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 48:
109 – 123, 2014. ISSN 1355-2198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsb.
23
2014.08.005. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S1355219814000896. Relativistic Causality.
Steven Weinberg and R. H. Dicke. Gravitation and cosmology: principles and
applications of the general theory of relativity. Wiley New York, 1973.
Hermann Weyl. Zur Infinitesimalgeometrie: Einordnung der projektiven und der
konformen Auffasung. Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften
zu Go¨ttingen, Mathematisch-Physikalische Klasse, 1921:99–112, 1921.
Rasmus G. Winther. The structure of scientific theories. In Edward N. Zalta,
editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab,
Stanford University, winter 2016 edition, 2016.
Christian Wu¨thrich. To quantize or not to quantize: fact and folklore in quan-
tum gravity. Philosophy of Science, 72(5):777–788, 2005.
Christian Wu¨thrich. Are black holes about information?, 2019. In Richard
Dawid, Radin Dardashti, and Karim The´bault, editors, Epistemology of Fun-
damental Physics, Cambridge University Press, 2019.
24
